[ 楊日旭 ]——(2001-8-16) / 已閱42501次
① 總統(tǒng)為三軍統(tǒng)帥，軍事不受政治干涉，亦不應(yīng)與政治競(jìng)選活動(dòng)或黨派活動(dòng)相紀(jì)纏不清（“offical military activities free from entanglement with partisan political campaign of any kind.”）
② 軍事基地與一般平民活動(dòng)場(chǎng)所有別。“軍事基地旨在訓(xùn)練士兵而非提供政治討論場(chǎng)所”（“The business of military installation like Fort Dix is to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum for politics”）；
③ “施醫(yī)生及其它人并無(wú)一般化的憲法權(quán)利在Fort Dix基地發(fā)表政治演說(shuō)或散發(fā)競(jìng)選文件。”（Dr. Spock and others“had no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets at Fort Dix”）
又根據(jù)Parker v. Levy, 1974一案，聯(lián)邦最高法院特別強(qiáng)調(diào)，李維（Howard Levy）上尉反對(duì)越戰(zhàn)，煸動(dòng)黑人拒服兵役參加作戰(zhàn)，經(jīng)軍事法庭依據(jù)統(tǒng)一軍法法典（Uniform code of Military Justice判刑，系基于軍人與平民不同，故統(tǒng)一軍法法典第一三三及一三四兩條并無(wú)違憲之處。軍人雖亦享有言論、宗教及集會(huì)自由，但在行使之程度上自亦不同。）
（6）在大街交通要道之示威Cox v. Louisiana, No. 24, 1965：一九六一年，B. Elton Cox故師率領(lǐng)兩千名南方大學(xué)Southern University學(xué)生在路易西安那州之Baton Rouge城市之市中心區(qū)游行抗議種族歧視，陰礙交通，經(jīng)警方逮捕移送法院，以兩項(xiàng)罪名起訴：①擾亂社會(huì)公共秩序（disturbing the peace under Louisiana’s breach of the peace statute）。被告Cox牧師不服抗告，再經(jīng)上訴，終由聯(lián)邦最高法院裁決認(rèn)為兩項(xiàng)罪名均不能成立。以全票批駁地方法院對(duì)擾亂社會(huì)安寧妨害公共秩序所定之罪刑，又以七對(duì)二票推翻陰礙交通之罪刑判決。主要理由為該州有關(guān)管制示威游行之法規(guī)畢予執(zhí)法官員以“無(wú)羈裁量權(quán)”，而且規(guī)定之條文太過(guò)含混籠統(tǒng)，不易適從，使被告之言論自由及集會(huì)自由遭到危害。
盡管Cox獲得司法救濟(jì)，無(wú)罪開釋，但負(fù)責(zé)主稿判決之書之自由派大法官高柏格（Justice Goldberg）在本案中對(duì)以示威游行作為街頭對(duì)抗政治（Street confrontation potitics）之范圍及限制則作以上權(quán)重要之解釋：
①?gòu)倪@些判例中可以看出若干明顯而清楚之原則，言論及結(jié)社自由雖為我國(guó)民主社會(huì)之基本原則，但還不能說(shuō)每一個(gè)人隨時(shí)隨地地對(duì)任何社團(tuán)都可以發(fā)表其意見和信仰（“From these decisions certain clear principles emerge. The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that every one with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any place and any time.”）
②“憲法上所保障這自由權(quán)即隱攝著一個(gè)維持公共秩序的確有組織的社會(huì)之存在，如果沒(méi)有它的存在，自由本身即會(huì)在過(guò)激的無(wú)政治狀態(tài)中喪失”（“The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.”）
③“控制街道交通很清楚的是政府維護(hù)必要秩序責(zé)任的題例，任何人以不遵守眾所周知之紅綠燈之交通規(guī)則作為社會(huì)抗議的手段則是不合理的（“The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light becausr this was thought to be a means of social protest.”）”
④“任何人亦不得違反交通規(guī)則，堅(jiān)持于交通尖鋒時(shí)間在時(shí)報(bào)廣場(chǎng)上舉街頭集會(huì)，作為行使其言論自由或集會(huì)自由的方式。政府當(dāng)局有義務(wù)及責(zé)任保持大街道路之交通暢行無(wú)阻。”（“Not could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement.”）
⑤“游行示威群眾不得堅(jiān)持有權(quán)封閉某條街道及進(jìn)出公私場(chǎng)所之通路，亦不得禁止任何拒聽說(shuō)教之行人這通行”。（“A group of demonstrators could not insist upon the rright to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations.”）
由以上判例則知，在美國(guó)大街游行示威的集會(huì)自由權(quán)并非一絕對(duì)的權(quán)利。
（7）在法院前之示威游行Cox v. Louisiana, 1965, No. 49：本案之第三個(gè)爭(zhēng)議主題為被告Cox在法院“附近”（near）游行是否違法而應(yīng)加懲處。路易西安那州法律明文規(guī)定“任何人在法院或法院附近舉牌抗議或游行示威，意圖干涉、陰撓、妨害司法行政，或意圖影響法官、陪審員、證人及司法官員、執(zhí)行職務(wù)，均應(yīng)處五千元以上罰金或一年以下之臨禁，或兩罰并處。”（“Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officers, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”）。根據(jù)此一法律，地方法院以被告違法在法院對(duì)街一○一尺“附近”示威游行，抗拒警方要求群眾解散之命令，因而將之判刑。被告不服，認(rèn)為地方法院及州法院均侵犯其在憲法上之言論及集會(huì)自由權(quán)，遂經(jīng)次上訴。最后聯(lián)邦最高法院裁決該州最高法官判罪所據(jù)之理由不足，遂宜告原判不能成立，被告終因無(wú)罪而開釋。聯(lián)邦最高法院所持之理由如下：
① 該州禁止在法官“附近”游行示威之規(guī)定雖無(wú)不妥但“附近”詞之解釋仍嫌籠統(tǒng)（indefinite），含混(vague)，且畢予警官以“無(wú)羈裁量權(quán)”（unfrttered discretion）任加解釋；
② 法規(guī)既明文禁止在法院“附近”游行，故凡在法院“附近”游行理應(yīng)均屬違法，但警方負(fù)責(zé)高級(jí)官員既已指定群眾在法院對(duì)街一○一尺之場(chǎng)地“可以游行”，則知警官已將“附近”一詞解釋為一○一尺合法之場(chǎng)地，可以游行，卻在事后出爾反爾，變更解釋，下令群眾解散，顯系警官任意裁量，致使示威者無(wú)所適從。基于此，聯(lián)邦最高級(jí)法院認(rèn)為州最高法院之判決不能成立。此雖系咬文嚼字，但卻表示“依法主治”之精神。
因?yàn)楸景赶狄源藬?shù)權(quán)為接近之五對(duì)四票裁決，而且少數(shù)派之四名大法官均強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)，認(rèn)為此種裁決易滋誤解，外界或以為聯(lián)邦最高法院批準(zhǔn)任何人得在法院內(nèi)外或附近游行示威。事實(shí)上，該院大法官無(wú)論在本案中之立場(chǎng)如何，均同意為維護(hù)司法審判獨(dú)立及法院尊嚴(yán)，向不容任何人或團(tuán)體在法院聚眾集會(huì)，以滸行示威方式威脅、干涉或影響法院之司法程序。為澄清此一判例可能造成之誤會(huì)，大法官高柏格在判決主文中迅即指出此一重要附加之說(shuō)明：
① 路易西安那州 禁止在法院及附近示威游行之法規(guī)無(wú)論其在文字及內(nèi)容均無(wú)不妥且符合一九四九年九月廿三日在美國(guó)司法會(huì)議“禁止在法院示威抗議之立法議案特別委員會(huì)”所提之報(bào)告，該項(xiàng)報(bào)告一致贊成國(guó)會(huì)應(yīng)制訂立法禁止在法院抗議示威。一九五○年國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)有關(guān)聯(lián)邦司法制度之制度（64 Stat. 1081, 18 U. S.C. § 1507, 1958 ed.）即禁止在法院示威抗議。該州法律即依據(jù)此一聯(lián)邦立法而制訂此一州法，故理無(wú)不合；
② 同理，各州之司法制度亦應(yīng)禁止在法院之示威抗議以免受外界之壓力。因?yàn)楸驹菏难灾С址ㄖ握侨苏ā癢e are committed to a government of law and not a government of men”）；
③ “司法程序之任何階段不應(yīng)受暴民干涉。暴民干涉法律正為適法程序之反。”（“There is no room at any stage of judicial proceedings for such intervention; mob law is the very antithesis of due process”）；
④ 本院認(rèn)為“某種與言論混合之行為即得加以規(guī)限及禁止”（……that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited.），換言之，聯(lián)邦最高法院在本案中反復(fù)指出“言論自由如與某種行為混合即不為憲法之必然保護(hù)”（“……that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutiilnal protection.”）在法院附近，游行非純言論（pure speech），即系附加行動(dòng)，故應(yīng)受法律規(guī)限；
⑤ 本院雖將州最高法院之原判批駁，但并“非謂警察對(duì)最初系和平而后變?yōu)楸﹣y之集會(huì)不得予以制止”。（“Of course, this does not mean that the police cannot call a halt to a meeting which though originally peaceful, becomes violent.”）再者，“本院亦非指凡經(jīng)謹(jǐn)審擬訂及執(zhí)行之法律命令均不得對(duì)集會(huì)設(shè)定合理之時(shí)間限制”（“Nor does it mean that, under properly drafted and administered statutes and ordinances, the authorities cannot set reasonable time limits for assemblies.”）而“本院僅認(rèn)為本案在目前情況下，上訴人之罪狀未能基于警方之解散令而成立”（We merely hold that, under circumstances such as those present in this case, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of the dispersa order.）；
⑥ “本院在本案及上案（No.24）所作有關(guān)在法院及其附近舉行示威行動(dòng)之裁決，概不得解釋為對(duì)任何形式及示威之動(dòng)亂行為加以認(rèn)可，無(wú)論此種示威游行如何和平，動(dòng)機(jī)如何可嘉，如其與旨在促進(jìn)法治與秩序，保護(hù)社會(huì)免于動(dòng)亂，管制交通規(guī)則，維護(hù)公私財(cái)產(chǎn)之合法利益，保障司法行政以及其他政府主要公務(wù)職責(zé)之嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)法律相抵觸則本院即不認(rèn)可。”（“Nothing we have said here or in No. 24, ante, is to be interpreted as sanctioning riotous conduct in any form or demonstrations, however peaceful or commendable their notives, which conflict with properly drawn statutes and ordinances designed to promtote law and order, protect the community against disorder, regulate traffic, safeguard legitimate interests in private and public property, or protect the adminlstration of justice and other essential gorernmental functions.”）。
最后，聯(lián)邦最高法院對(duì)本案曾作一項(xiàng)肯定結(jié)論說(shuō)，“自由只有在一個(gè)衛(wèi)護(hù)秩序的法律制度之下始可行使。”（“Liberty can only be exercised in a system of law which safeguards order.”）
2、有關(guān)示威游行之方式：美國(guó)各種政治及社會(huì)團(tuán)體為爭(zhēng)取其本身利益而采取各種方式以行動(dòng)表示抗議：
（1）以手段分則有和平抗議及激烈抗議：前者為室內(nèi)或街頭之和平合法集會(huì)及示威抗議游行，后者如采取過(guò)激之暴力違法行動(dòng)，如搗毀公私財(cái)物，破壞交通秩序，加暴他人等等。前者多為法律所允許之合法行動(dòng)，后者則為違法之行動(dòng)；
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